| SES # | Topics | READINGS |
|---|---|---|
| Bargaining | ||
| 1 | Bargaining with Complete Information | Theory, Based on the Works of Rubinstein, Binmore, and Merlo and Wilson Rubinstein, A. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model." Econometrica 50, no. 1 (1982): 97-110.  Binmore, Ken. "Perfect Equilibria in Bargaining Models." In The Economics of Bargaining. Edited by K. Binmore and P. Dasgupta. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1987, pp. 77-105. ISBN: 0631142541.Merlo, A., and C. Wilson. "A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information." Econometrica 63, no. 2 (1995): 371-399. |
| 2 | Bargaining with Complete Information (cont.) | Applications and Extensions Bulow, J., and K. Rogoff. "A constant recontracting model of sovereign debt." Journal of Political Economy 97, no. 1 (1989): 155-78. Baron, D., and J. Ferejohn. "Bargaining in legislatures." American Political Science Review 89 (1989): 1181-1206. Merlo, A. "Bargaining over Governments in a Stochastic Environment." Journal of Political Economy 105 (February 1997): 101-131. Diermeier, D., H. Eraslan, and A. Merlo. "A Structural Model of Government Formation." Econometrica 71 (2003): 27-70. Perry, M., and L. Samuelson. "Open vs. Closed Door Negotiations." RAND Journal of Economics 25 (1994): 348-359. Cai, H. "Bargaining on behalf of a constituency." Journal of Economic Theory 92 (2000): 234-273. Stole, L., and J. Zwiebel. "Intra-Firm Bargaining under Non-Binding Contracts." The Review of Economic Studies 63, no. 3 (1996). Yildiz, M. "Walrasian bargaining." Games and Economic Behavior 45 (2003). Davila, J., and J. Eeckhout. "Competitive Bargaining Equilibrium." PIER Working Paper Archive 04-024, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 2004. Li, D. "Bargaining with History-Dependent Preferences." Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 516, Econometric Society. Tyson, C. "Iterative Dominance and Sequential Bargaining." Economics Papers 2004-W23, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford, 2004. Hart, O., and J.H. Moore. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In." STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series /2004/472, Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE, 2004. Bernheim, B., A. Rangel, and L. Rayo. "The Power of the Last Word in Legislative Policy Making." Econometrica (2004). (forthcoming) |
| 3 | Bargaining with Incomplete Information | Bargaining with Incomplete Information |
| 4 | Bargaining with Incomplete Information (cont.) | Two-sided Asymmetric Information Cramton, P. "Bargaining with incomplete information: an infinite horizon model with two sided asymmetric information." Review of Economic Studies 51 (1984): 579-593. ———. "Strategic delay in bargaining with two-sided uncertainty." Review of Economic Studies 59 (1992): 205-225. Abreu, D., and F. Gul. "Bargaining and Reputation," Econometrica 68, no. 1 (2000): 85-117. Feinberg, Y., and A. Skrzypacz. "Uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in bargaining." Econometrica 73, no. 1 (2005): 69-71. |
| 5 | Bargaining with Incomplete Information (cont.) | Applications Spier, K. "The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation." Review of Economic Studies 59, no. 1 (1992): 93-108. Gul, F. "Unobservable Investment and the Hold-Up Problem." Econometrica 69, no. 2 (2001): 343-376. Heifetz, A., and E. Segev. "Escalation and delay in long international conflicts." The School of Economics, Tel Aviv University, 2002. |
| 6 | Bargaining with Incomplete Information (cont.) | Empirical and Experimental Studies Cramton, P., and J. Tracy. "Strikes and holdouts in wage bargaining: Theory and data." American Economic Review 82, no. 1 (March 1992): 100-121. Roth, A., J. Murnighan, and F. Schoumaker. "The Deadline Effect in Bargaining: Some Experimental Evidence." American Economic Review 78, no. 4 (1988): 806-823. |
| 7 | Bargaining with Heterogeneous Beliefs | Bargaining with Heterogeneous Beliefs Yildiz, M. "Bargaining without a common prior - An immediate agreement theorem." Econometrica 71, no. 3 (2003): 793-811. ———. "Waiting to persuade." Quarterly Journal of Economics 119, no. 1 (2004): 223-248. Ali, S. Nageeb. "Multilateral Bargaining with Subjective Biases: Waiting To Settle." Journal of Economic Theory (April 4, 2005). (forthcoming) Watanabe, Yasutora. "Learning and bargaining in dispute resolution: Theory and evidence from medical malpractice litigation." 2005 Meeting Papers 440, Society for Economic Dynamics, 2005. |
| Higher-order Uncertainty | ||
| 8 | Higher-order Uncertainty | Theory Carlsson, Hans, and Eric van Damme. "Global Games and Equilibrium Selection." Econometrica 61, no. 5 (1993): 989-1018. Frankel, D., S. Morris, and A. Pauzner. "Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities." Journal of Economic Theory 108, no. 1 (2003): 1-44. Battigalli, P., and M. Siniscalchi. "Rationalization and Incomplete Information." Advances in Theoretical Economics 3, no. 1 (2003). (Article 3) Dekel, E., D. Fudenberg, and S. Morris. "Interim Rationalizability." Harvard Institute of Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 2064, 2003. ———. 2004. "Dense Types." Faculty working paper, August 2005. Ely, J., and M. Peski. "Hierarchies of beliefs and interim rationalizability." CMS-EMS Northwestern University Working Paper No. 1388, 2004. Weinstein, J.,and M. Yildiz. "Finite-order implications of any equilibrium." Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000000065, UCLA Department of Economics, 2004. Yildiz, M. "Rationalizability on universal type space." Faculty working paper, Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2004. Angeletos, G., C. Hellwig, and A. Pavan. "Information Dynamics and Equilibrium Multiplicity in Global Games of Regime Change." NBER Working Papers 11017, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2004. |
| 9 | Higher-order Uncertainty (cont.) | Applications Morris, S., and H.S. Shin. "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fulfilling Currency Attacks." American Economic Review 88, no. 3 (1998): 587-597. ———. "Global Games - Theory and Applications." In Advances in Economics and Econometrics. Edited by M. Dewatripont, L. Hansen, and S. Turnovsky. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003, 56-114. ISBN: 0521524113.———. "Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomics." NBER Macroeconomics Annual (2000): 139-161. ———. "Coordination Risk and the Price of Debt." European Economic Review 48 (2004): 133-153. ———. "Liquidity Black Holes." Review of Finance 8, no. 1 (2004): 1-18. Frankel, D., and A. Pauzner. "Resolving Indeterminacy in Dynamic Settings: The Role of Shocks." Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, no. 1 (2000): 285-304. Goldstein, I., and A. Pauzner. "Contagion of Self-Fulfilling Financial Crises due to Diversification of Investment Portfolios." Journal of Economic Theory 119, no. 1 (2004): 151-183. Angeletos, G., C. Hellwig, and A. Pavan. "Coordination and Policy Traps (Signaling in a Global Coordination Game)." NBER Working Papers 9767, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2003. Angeletos, G., and I. Werning. "Crises and Prices." NBER Working Papers 11015, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2004. Corsetti, G., B. Guimaraes, and N. Roubini. "International Lending of Last Resort and Moral Hazard: A Model of IMF's Catalytic Finance." NBER Working Papers 10125, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 2004. Dasgupta, A. "Coordination, Learning and Delay." FMG Discussion Papers dp435, Financial Markets Group, 2002. Neeman, Z. "The Relevance of Private Information in Mechanism Design." Journal of Economic Theory 117, no. 1 (2004): 55-77. Heifetz, A., and Z. Neeman. "On the Generic Infeasibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design." Working paper, 2003. Edmond, C.. "Information and the Limits to Autocracy." Working paper, Department of Economics, UCLA, 2003. |
| Unawareness | ||
| 10 | Unawareness | Unawareness Dekel, E., Lipman, B. L., and A. Rustichini. "Standard State-Space Models Preclude Unawareness." Econometrica 66, no. 1 (1998): 159-174. ———. "Recent Developments in Modelling Unforseen Contingencies." European Economic Review 42 (1998): 523-542. Li, J. "Unawareness." Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, August 2004. Modica, S., and A. Rustichini. "Unawareness and partitional information structures." Games and Economic Behavior 27, no. 2 (1999): 265-298. Feinberg, Y. "Subjective Reasoning - Games with Unawareness." Stanford Graduate Business School, Research Paper Series, Paper no. 1875, November 2004. Fagin, R., and J. Y. Halpern. "Belief, awareness, and limited reasoning." Artificial Intelligence 34, no. 1 (1987): 39-76. Halpern, J. Y. "Alternative Semantics for Unawareness." Games and Economic Behavior 37, no. 2 (2001): 321-339. Heifetz, A., Meier, M., and B. C. Schipper. "Interactive Unawareness." Discussion Papers 52, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, University of Mannheim, 2004. Modica, S., and A. Rustichini. "Awareness and partitional information structures." Theory and Decision 37, no. 1 (1994): 107-124. |
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