Courses:

This section features information about the portions covered in the primary textbook.  It also offers lists of additional references  and papers.

The primary book for this course is:

Bolton, Patrick, and Mathias Dewatripont. Contract Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. ISBN: 9780262025768.

We will cover the following sections in detail:

• Static bilateral contracting (adverse selection, screening, signaling, moral hazard). Chapters 2-4, 6.
• Static multilateral contracting. Chapters 7, 8.
• Dynamic contracting. Chapters 9, 10.
• Incomplete contracts. Chapters 11-13.

We will also cover these topics in the course:

• Theory of auctions (optimal auctions in particular: Myerson, Cremer-McLean)
• Mechanism design (auctions, general incentive schemes, generalized VCG mechanism in particular)
• Implementation theory
• Dynamic agreements (collusion schemes in particular)

We will overlook these areas:

• Theory of organizations
• Bargaining
• Political institutions
• Capital markets (or other direct applications to finance...)
• Behavioral models

Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston, and Jerry R. Green. Microeconomic Theory. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780195102680.

Fudenberg, Drew, and Jean Tirole. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. ISBN: 9780262061414.

Krishna, Vijay. Auction Theory. San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2002. ISBN: 9780124262973.

Hart, Oliver D. Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1995. ISBN: 9780198288817.

Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and Jean Tirole. A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993. ISBN: 9780262121743.

Salanié, Bernard. The Economics of Contracts: A Primer. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005. ISBN: 9780262195256.

References (PDF)