| Lec # | Topics | key dates |
|---|---|---|
| 1-2 | Choice under Uncertainty | |
| 3-4 | Introduction Definitions (Nash, Perfect, Sequential Equilibrium, Rationalizability, Correlated Equilibrium, Backward Induction, Forward Induction, Sequential Rationality, Self Confirming Equilibria) | Problem set 1 due on lecture 3 |
| 5-7 | Classical Topics: Repeated Games | |
| 8-9 | Classical Topics: Cheap Talk, Signaling, and Reputation | |
| 10 | Classical Topics: Bargaining Theory | |
| 11 | Review | Problem set 2 due one day after lecture 11 |
| 12 | Classical Topics: Supermodular Games | |
| 13-16 | Learning and Evolutionary Foundations | |
| 17-19 | Epistemic Foundations | |
| 20 | Review | |
| 21 | New Topics: Global Games | Problem set 3 due |
| 22 | New Topics: Heterogeneous Beliefs | |
| 23 | New Topics: Psychological Games | Problem set 4 due one day after lecture 23 |
| 24-25 | New Topics: Game Theory with Non-Expected Utility | |
| 26 | Final Exam |